Talk:Battle of France

fall of france

what caused the fall of france 70.26.105.194 (talk) 18:57, 26 November 2022 (UTC)

One factor was that they left the ardennes to go and hep defend belgium, a region with heavy treeline and bumpy hills because they thought that Hitler couldn't penetrate the area with so many troops and tanks however, Hitler did penetrate his forces through the area and blasted through the french lines which French Commanders were caught veyr off guard by. 72.138.179.198 (talk) 17:55, 1 December 2022 (UTC)

BEF size

In the prelude section under 'Allies' it states that at the start of battle the BEF was 1.6 million men. Given the BEF was only 13 divisions that is clearly wrong. Firestar47 (talk) 10:47, 26 March 2023 (UTC)

I think that seeing as 250,000 were taken home from Dunkirk and another 150,000+ emigre contingents from other ports it might be that the 1 in 1.6 million is wrong. Keith-264 (talk) 11:02, 26 March 2023 (UTC)

Maybe. Annoyingly all the books on my shelf give only the number of divisions. The number though is written in full so is unlikely a typing error. Firestar47 (talk) 11:00, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

The number of 1.6 million men refers not to the BEF but to the total armed forces, territorial divisions and units in training included.--MWAK (talk) 14:11, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

Yes I think the author has added a zero to the figure. 160,000 would tally with 13 divisions, and with the numbers rescued in Operation Dynamo. Davelovatt (talk) 17:47, 19 September 2024 (UTC)

Prelude

It says that the french mobilised 5 million men but that only half served in units in the north. So where were the other half? Are we talking about the navy as well? I feel this needs clarification. Firestar47 (talk) 10:56, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

Well, the text now states "France mobilised about one-third of the male population between the ages of 20 and 45, bringing the strength of its armed forces to 5,000,000" but this is a clear mistake. The male population of France numbered about twenty million in 1940 and about six million of these were between 20 and 45 years old.--MWAK (talk) 14:30, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

Well I've just been to my bookshelf, both books I checked gave the mobilization figure as 5 million so that bit seems right. Firestar47 (talk) 20:56, 28 June 2023 (UTC)

Size of Allied Forces involved

(originally from Loic on AHF) "Pierre Le Goyet La défaite 10 mai-25 juin 1940 gives for Metropolitan France 1. may 1940

2 651 802 "aux Armées" (means the Front) 529 028 des formations du territoire (Interior) 675 386 Depôts et Centres d'Organisation (Interior) 75 638 Foreigners (RMVE & Légion in Métropolitan France, Polish & Czechoslovak Armies) 53 466 in the hospitals"

Overseas and Air forces aren't included in the above nor is naval. For the Belgians and Dutch, the wiki articles show 600,000-650,000 men and 280,000 men respectively. The BEF in France was 390,000 men. Luxembourg had 693. Even if we only go with the Front armies for the French and even then exclude the 150,000 French attributed to the Alps (and no airforces), go with the lower Belgian estimate, and ignore the RAF that totals to at least 3,770,000. Something is seriously wrong with the article. 47.220.25.18 (talk) 06:12, 14 June 2024 (UTC)

Do you have any written sources for your claims? Keith-264 (talk) 20:30, 14 June 2024 (UTC)

Plan names

Somehow I noticed and lowercased "Weygand plan" before noticing the other named plans. Looking at n-gram stats, it seems that these were initially much more often lowercase, but the capitalization has been creeping up over years. Still, not close to the "consistently capitalized in sources" criterion in the MOS:CAPS guideline about what to treat as a proper name. The Escaut plan shows up much less in sources, but also sometimes lowercase, as here (one of several books quoting this 1941 passage, or maybe something older). On the other hand, the names "Plan D", etc., seem more often treated as proper names. So shall we fix them accordingly? Dicklyon (talk) 21:50, 9 August 2024 (UTC)

Seeing as you've taken the time to do the work, why not? Regards Keith-264 (talk) 07:30, 10 August 2024 (UTC)

Recent edits

@Tordrey joenks: Greetings, would you like to discuss the fate of your edit? Regards Keith-264 (talk) 17:17, 28 October 2024 (UTC)

It was largely factually incorrect...--MWAK (talk) 07:01, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

MWAK, (I am repeating my response to someone else here): I thoroughly read the two books on the matter mentioned, and was left with this clear impression that the decision to stop so much military spending was the action of the new--and first ever--Socialist party government, who prioritized its people's every day lives over military spending. The strategic angle on stopping the Maginot line worked as well, and I believe that it became the dominant story. Tordrey joenks (talk) 09:30, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Hello, Keith. I thoroughly read the two books on the matter mentioned, and was left with this clear impression that the decision to stop so much military spending was the action of the new--and first ever--Socialist party government, who prioritized its people's every day lives over military spending. The strategic angle on stopping the Maginot line worked as well, and I believe that it became the dominant story. Tordrey joenks (talk) 09:28, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

The French wanted to fight another war in Belgium and killed two birds with one stone by fortifying the common border, on the basis that a soldier in a fortified position had the effect of seven in the open. The Maginot Line allowed the army to use 1/7th of the manpower it would have needed without fortifications. This meant that the army could afford to armour, mechanise and motorise the field army, safe in the knowledge that it would fight on a relatively narrow front. Given the difference in population sizes this was logical. The French socialists were sell-outs as usual, which is the job of socialist parteis and didn't last long before it was far-right as ususal. By 1939 French and British rearmament was catching up with the German rearmament that began in 1930 and no-one expected the Germans to win in six weeks. As Moltke the Elder had said, a mistake in the initial deployment can hardly be remedied during a campaign. It was the Breda Variant that did for the French, not decadence. I commend you on reading the books but it might do you good to read several more to see the evolution of opinions about the reasons for the Allied defeat and the incomplete victory of the Germans. Regards. Keith-264 (talk) 11:44, 29 October 2024 (UTC)

Your text: "These units ultimately are the ones that were quickly defeated during the coming invasion. The modernized armored forces fared quite well against Germany's panzers. However the holes in the French line created by the more obsolete armored units enabled the Germans to surround the modernized French units..." is misleading. The DCrs could not have been equipped with a more modern type, because the production capacity was simply lacking, given the state of the French industry. No amount of money could have remedied this, unless France would not have disarmed in the early 1920s. Whether they would have fared any better with more or more modern tanks is also very doubtful. Their main weakness was their intended tactical rôle as breakthrough units.--MWAK (talk) 06:34, 30 October 2024 (UTC)